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ABSTRACT 
Recently, the number of requests for multicast services through the wireless networks has been increased. 
However, for successful deployment, security and efficiency of content delivery must be provided at first.  
This paper presents a new approach for secure multicast in wireless networks. This approach, CRAW 
(Combination of Re-keying and Authentication in Wireless networks) combines member authentication 
procedure with group key management protocol to provide an efficient group re-keying process. One-
time password is proposed for member authentication and CKC (Code for Key Calculation) is suggested 
for group key management in wireless networks. In fact, the combination of authentication with group key 
management in wireless networks results in a simple and secure mechanism both for authentication and 
group key management while mobile members join/leave a group or move inter-area. Simulation results 
show that CRAW reduces re-keying overhead at join from O(log2n+1) to O(1) while security 
requirements are saved. Also, CRAW introduces storing a main list to manage mobile members' location 
while they move intra-group inter-area. 
KEYWORDS 
Secure Multicast,Group Key Management, Wireless Networks, Member Authentication, One-Time 
Password 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IP multicast is an efficient way for IP datagram delivery to multiple members. Its applications 
include electronic newspapers, multimedia file downloads, video conferencing and etc. Along 
with the development of wireless networks and also the increase of using mobile devices, the 
request for multicast applications such as mobile TV services, network games, and mobile 
commerce in wireless networks has grown up rapidly.  
In both wired and wireless networks, the security should be guaranteed first. As IP multicast 
uses IGMP (Internet Group Management Protocol) [1] for group membership, multicast group 
is managed openly. This lack of security in multicast leads to eavesdropping. The solution for 
limiting access to multicast content is encryption with group key. A group key is the key which 
is shared by sender and all group members. Next, the security requirements of multicast are 
forward secrecy and backward secrecy [2-5].The former ensures that when a member leaves the 
group, it cannot access the current contents. The latter ensures when a member joins a group, it 
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cannot access any past archive content. In order to provide these requirements, the group key 
needs to be updated on each membership change, join/leave, and to be delivered securely to 
valid multicast members. This process is known as group re-keying or re-keying in short.  
A number of protocols have been proposed for group key management [6-14]. These protocols 
have two kinds of weaknesses. First of all, most of these protocols have been designed for wired 
networks and cannot be introduced to wireless networks because in addition to join/leave 
(Figure 1), in wireless networks, movement of members (Figure 2) implies more complexity to 
group key management. For example, in Figure 2, u4moves from area “A” to area “B” in the 
same group while u1 joins multicast group in area “A” andu12 leaves the same multicast group in 
area “B”. Consequently, this additional behaviour, movement, increases the overhead of group 
key management largely in wireless networks. 
 
Figure 1.Join/leave in wired networks 
 
Figure 2.Join/leave and movement in wireless networks 
The second obstacle of previously proposed protocols is separation of authentication and group 
key management. In fact, they have only focused on efficient key distribution to valid members. 
Because of features of wireless networks, join/leave and movement, the overhead of re-keying 
is larger than wired networks. In order to decrease it, one solution is to combine the 
authentication with an efficient group key management.   
Some approaches address the group communication in wireless networks [15-17]. Without 
proposing any specific re-keying algorithm for mobile users in wireless environment, they have 
just suggested using one of the sophisticated methods proposed previously for group key 
management. However, in [18-20] new re-keying protocols for secure wireless multicast 
communications have been proposed. These protocols include distributed group key 
management method which is not able to reduce re-keying overhead for large number of mobile 
users who move between areas rapidly. Consequently, previously proposed protocols for mobile 
communication in wireless networks still suffer from re-keying overhead. 
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This paper proposes an efficient approach to decrease re-keying overhead in wireless networks. 
For this purpose, we combine authentication with group key management by using one-time 
password for authentication [21-23] and our previously proposed protocol [24] for group key 
management. Since the structure of wireless networks is very close to decentralized group key 
management, we use decentralized approach for our proposal. Finally, we add topology control 
to member movements in order to manage member location. For this purpose, a list of member 
movement information is stored in the main server.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work. Section 3 gives an 
overview to secure multicast, group key management and one-time password. The design 
principles and detailed design of our proposal are shown in section 4 and section 5, respectively. 
We discuss the security analysis of our protocol in section 6. We compare our approach with 
previously proposed group key management in section 7 and then complete our comparison 
with some simulation results.  Section 8 is the conclusion. 
2. RELATED WORK 
As stated before, movement of mobile members between different areas complicates group key 
management in wireless networks. Several approaches have been proposed for secure multicast 
in wireless networks [15-20].The main purpose of these approaches is how to handle re-keying 
efficiently and securely while mobile members in intra-group inter-area join/leave the group. 
The design of most of them is based on decentralized network structure in which the network is 
divided into multiple areas, and each area is managed by an area controller responsible for 
generating the keys for the area. Figure 3 illustrates the structure of such network where ASi is 
in Area Server (base station) for area i, AKi is an Area Key for area i, Mx is a mobile member 
who moves between areas and the main server which is connected by wire to AS.AK is 
generated for encrypting the group key as well as the group contents for area members and is 
sent to its area group members to be able to decrypt the group content. 
 
Figure 3.  Network partitions structure 
The main server is located on top network level. In Figure 3, the network is divided into two 
areas. Each area has a base station for delivering the group content received from the main 
server. The users, who are under the supervision of the different area base stations, need to 
receive group services from them. In wireless networks, if a mobile member moves between 
areas, the area keys are updated to support the security requirements.  
Static Re-key (SR) [15-17] proposes inter-area re-keying method. In SR (Figure 4(a)), the AS 
maintains the keys unchanged when Mxmoves from area “A” to area “B”.  So, movement of a 
member does not trigger any re-keying either in previous area or the new one. The ASA is still 
responsible for delivering its service when Mx moves to “B” without any registration with the 
new local area server. Then obviously, mobility of Mx affects neither the previous area re-
keying nor the new area re-keying. Although this proposal has the least re-keying overhead, it 
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suffers from the lack of security. Consequently, it cannot be supported with the most of 
applications which require security for content delivery. 
Baseline Re-keying (BR) method [15, 16] tries to solve the mobility of group members as well 
as security. In this method, Figure 4 (b), movement of a member is considered as a leave of the 
group from the previous area and re-joins the group in the new area. For this purpose, group key 
and the area key are updated twice, in the previous area and in the new one. Consequently, the 
first drawback of BR is the interruption in service delivery through the old and new areas 
because of its high re-keying overhead. The second drawback is that the system is not able to 
recognize each join/leave of a member from his movement cross the areas. Moreover, these 
approaches do not propose any re-keying protocol for the group key management. 
    
  
 
Figure 4.Area re-keying models (a) Static Re-keying (b) Baseline Re-keying (c) Immediate Re-
keying (d) Pure Delayed Re-keying and FEDRP (e) Model of [17] 
Immediate Re-key (IR) method [15, 16] is the extension of BR method. IR adds a hand-off 
mechanism to provide the member movement between areas. In this method (Figure 4(c)), when 
a member moves from area “A” to area “B”, it sends a signalling message synchronously to both 
areas. Both area servers concurrently update area keys while the group key is remained 
unchanged. The features of IR are its continuous data transmission without interruption, and 
member hand-off mechanism. Despite of this fact, it still implies high re-keying overhead 
because no re-keying approach is proposed and using current group key managements are not 
compatible for applications which need rapid re-keying. A protocol with low re-keying 
mechanism is needed.  
Delayed algorithm [15] proposes to postpone area re-keying until the pre-defined threshold is 
satisfied. The idea is based on the probability of returning the moving members to their previous 
area soon. Thus, the area re-keying in old areas is delayed for a threshold. That is, the old area 
key remains unchanged for reuse because that member may return promptly. Pure Delayed re-
keying (Figure 4(d)) is similar to Delayed algorithm in the concept. In this method, local server 
maintains a list, Extra Key Owner List (EKOL), from members who have moved to other areas. 
The key in old area is changed when a join/leave happens otherwise, the key is kept unchanged. 
EKOL is renewed whenever join/leave occurs in the area. By use of this list, when a member 
returns to its previous area, it is checked with the EKOL and if it is on that list, there will no 
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need to update area key. The drawback of this approach is that backward secrecy is not assured 
till the next join/leave. 
The other suggested method in this research area is Periodic re-keying [15].In this approach, 
area key update is done periodically without considering member movement. So, by 
periodically re-keying, no area key remains valid for more than a fixed pre-defined period of 
time. Actually, this proposal can be used in conjunction with other inter-area re-keying 
algorithms too. 
First Entry Delayed Rekey+Periodic (FEDRP) [16], Fig. 4(d), is the combination of Delayed 
and Periodic re-keying protocols. When a member moves intra-group from area “A” to area “B”, 
it sends concurrently two signalling messages to both area servers synchronously. Then, that 
member is added to EKOL in old area. EKOL is reset when the period is expired or a group 
join/leave is occurred. By this method, FEDRP improves significantly the inter-area re-keying 
by keeping old area keys unchanged. However, keeping EKOL seems to add additional storage 
overhead to previous area because it is more probable that a member enters a new area for the 
first time than is back to previous area. 
Authors in [17] propose area re-keying in new visited area by introducing a specific key called 
Visitor Encryption Key(VEK). VEK is delivered to a mobile member who moves to a new area. 
As shown in Figure 4(e), when a member moves form area “A” to area “B”, it sends a signalling 
message to both area servers synchronously to notify about its mobility. Next, ASB sends the 
VEKB to Mx using a secure channel. VEKB acts like AKBwithin the area. In this proposal, each 
area server stores two kinds of owner lists: EKOL as well as a Visitor-Key Owner List, VKOL, 
for mobile members. VKOL contains the list of members still holding a valid VEK but have left 
the area of that VEK. By this way, this method separates re-keying of mobile members from 
non-mobile members. As a result, no area re-keying is needed when a mobile group member 
moves between two areas.  In fact, both backward and forward secrecies are assured along the 
mobility between areas. The drawback of this mechanism is that “one affects n members”. This 
means that each join/leave to the group causes re-keying for visitor members as well as area 
non-mobile members. Afterwards, separating the assigned keys of mobile members and the 
non-mobile ones is not a reasonable way for reducing the re-keying overhead.  
Authors in [18, 19] propose a distributed group key management which divides group members 
into leaders and general members. The leaders participate in key management on behalf of 
general members. Authors believe that no area re-keying in both, old and new ones, is needed 
for member movement between two areas. For this purpose, hand-off member mechanism is 
defined to handle the member mobility. By this protocol, the backward and forward secrecy is 
not satisfied by maintaining the area key in both sides for mobile members. By using their 
distributed key management, they have reduced the re-keying overhead in comparison with 
LKH algorithm. However, the distributed architecture is not matched with wireless network 
structure. Therefore, it is not very useful in implementation.  
Authors in [20] present a multicast key management tree for the mobile users in wireless 
networks. They design this tree according to wireless network topology. They claim that 
dividing the network into two separate levels, wired and wireless networks, improves the overall 
performance of re-keying in wireless networks. 
3. OVERVIEW OF GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL AND ONE-TIME 
PASSWORD 
In this section, network structure of secure multicast is defined firstly.  Then, we give a brief 
description of key tree structure. Next, an overview to our previously proposed group key 
management [22] is given. Finally, our suggested member authentication protocol [23] using 
one-time password is overviewed. 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, July 2012 
112 
 
 
 
 
IGMP
Multicast Sender
Sender
KS
Key Server
group member
multicast data delivery
non-group member
u
1
u
2
u
3
u
5
u
4
u
6
u
i
Join/leave request
 
 
Figure 5.  Network structure of group communications in secure multicast [21] 
3.1. Network Structure 
Figure 5 illustrates network structure of group communication in secure multicast. There exist 
three major entities, key server, multicast sender, and multicast receivers. The key server is 
responsible for generating and delivering the necessary keys to authorized group members. The 
multicast sender sends content to the group members. The group members are the users who are 
authorized for receiving the desired multicast services. On each group membership change, the 
necessary keys should be updated and distributed to group members securely. As illustrated in 
Figure 5, when a new member joins the group, u4, it sends an IGMP request to its nearest router 
to receive multicast data from the network. Also, the new member, u4, sends a join request to 
the key server. After being accepted, re-keying process is started. All the updated keys must be 
delivered to the multicast sender, new user, u4, and all existing members, u1, u2 and u3.When a 
member leaves the group, it sends an IGMP request to stop content delivery. Then, this member 
informs the key server by sending a leave message. At this time, re-keying for remaining 
members is performed. 
3.2. An Overview to Structure of Logical Key Tree 
In LKH based protocols [5-14], the members of multicast group are mapped with the leaves of a 
logical key tree (Figure 6). This tree is a d-ary tree, typically a binary one. Each member stores 
all the keys along the path from his leaf node to the root. The middle nodes are auxiliary keys 
which help the delivery of other keys. The root node is the group key. When a member joins or 
leaves the group, all the keys in his possession need to be changed to new ones. If the tree is 
binary, the new key is securely distributed by encrypting it using the two child keys. Since the 
height of the key tree is log n, the complexity of the key distribution is also O(log n) (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 shows a simple example of the logical key tree for a multicast group with seven 
members (u2 through u8). Whenu1joins the group, the node keys, K1,2and K1,4, and the group key, 
KG, are changed to K’1,2, K’1,4, and K’Grespectively, because those nodes are on the path from u1 
to the root. Key generation, key encryption and key distribution for new member are done in the 
following order. First, all the keys which u1 needs to have, K’1,2, K’1,4, and K’G, are sent through 
unicast to u1 being encrypted with K1, K’1,2, and K’1,4respectively. 
For current members, the distribution is done in the following order. K’1,2is sent to u2 by unicast, 
being encrypted with K2.K’1,4is sent by multicast to u2and to {u3,u4} being encrypted with 
K’1,2and K3,4,respectively. Also, K’Gis sent by multicast for {u2, u3, u4} and for {u5, u6, u7, u8}, 
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being encrypted with K’1,4and K5,8, respectively. When a member leaves the group, key 
generation, key encryption and key delivery to remaining members is done in the same manner. 
 
Figure 6.The logical key tree for LKH based approaches at join/leave [22] 
3.3. Code for Key Calculation (CKC) 
CKC [22] is the most efficient group key management protocol which can be used in wireless 
networks because it focuses on user side key calculation rather than server side key distribution. 
CKC inherits the concept of logical key tree from LKH. In CKC, when a new member joins the 
group, server sends only the group key for that new member. Then, current members and that 
new member calculate the necessary keys by node code and one-way hash function. Moreover, 
at leave, only the group key is sent to remaining members, then those members calculate the 
necessary key by using node code and one-way hash function. 
A node code is a random number which is assigned to each node to help users calculate 
necessary keys. A new node code is generated by concatenating a random number to right digit 
of its parent node code, child_node_code= (parent_node_code|| random_digit). Figure 7 shows 
the node code assignment in key tree. For example, when a node code is 645 and the generated 
random number is 2, the code assigned to that node will be 6452. Moreover, when the number 
of nodes increases, for each new node, the same process is repeated. Generally, each member 
can reach to his parent node code by deleting the right digit from the child code. By this 
mechanism, each member knows the codes of all nodes in the path to the root. So, members 
update affected node keys by these codes and applying hash function after each membership 
change. 
 
Figure 7.Node code management in CKC  
In CKC, when a new member joins the group, it is allocated to a node in key tree. Then, the 
node code and individual key are delivered to it securely. The server encrypts the group key 
with the new member’s individual key and sends it to that member by unicast. The current 
members apply a one-way hash function to previous group key to calculate the new one. When f 
is a one-way hash function and KG is the previous group key, the new group key, K’G, is 
calculated through the formula below by current members. 
( )G GK f K′ =  
The affected middle node keys are updated by this formula in user side. Where 
Cmiddle_nodedenotes the new code of middle node and K’G is the current group key, and 
K’middle_nodeis the middle node key in the path to the root. 
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_ _
( )middle node G middle nodeK f K C′ ′= ⊕  
When a member leaves a multicast group, the node of leaving member is deleted from the key 
tree, and its sibling member is moved to its parent position node. Then, the key server generates 
a new group key and then encrypts it by the keys of top nodes on each half of the key tree. 
Again, related middle node keys are computed by members themselves using node codes and 
one-way hash function. 
Obviously, CKC reduces key generation and key encryption overhead largely at join/leave 
compared to other LKH based protocols. Moreover, the unicast and multicast communication 
overhead are decreased at join by CKC method largely. In fact, these properties are needed for 
secure multicast in wireless networks. Because, in such networks, in addition to join/leave, the 
inter-area intra-group movement of a mobile member is also considered as leaving the old area 
and joining new area. 
3.4. One-Time Password Protocol 
One-time password protocol SAS (Simple and Secure) authentication protocol, [23, 24], 
consists of two phases, registration and authentication. At the registration phase, the supplicant 
registers a hash value which is generated by bitwise XOR of its password, S, and a random 
number, Ni, to the server. After a period of time when the authentication is needed, it moves to 
authentication phase. At this phase, the registered member generates two other hash values, 
α andβ, generated by bitwise XOR of S and a new random number, Ni+1, and sends to the 
server. Then, the server performs some calculations on α and β to verify if the extracted value 
matches the registered one. When the values match, the user is authenticated. Part of this 
extracted hash value at the authentication phase is registered for re-authentication. The details of 
this algorithm will be explained by an example in section 5. 
4. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
We introduce our efficient re-keying approach for mobile members in wireless networks. The 
purpose of this protocol is to reduce re-keying overhead without any interrupt in content 
distribution while security requirements are assured. For reducing re-keying overhead, we use 
our previously proposed group key management protocol, (CKC) and combine it with 
authentication operation. In addition, we introduce members’ topology control list to manage 
mobile user location in wireless networks. The following steps show the design principles of our 
approach. 
Figure 8 illustrates network structure of secure multicast in wireless networks. This network has 
four elements; the main server, Area Wireless Server (AWS), mobile members and a main list. 
The main server is responsible for sending group content to each AWS and storing the main list. 
The main list contains mobile members’ information regarding join/leave and movement. Each 
AWS is responsible for authentication, generating and sending group key, and finally 
transmitting content to mobile members. The main server has wired connection to all area 
wireless servers through the network. In this level, main server and AWSs share a specific key. 
As this figure shows, wireless network is divided into several areas. Each AWS is responsible 
for connecting mobile users to the network. In wireless network level, mobile members move 
between areas while remaining in the same group. 
The main list stored in the main server supports users’ topology control and user authentication 
information. Authentication information of registered members is saved in this list globally. 
Different AWSs refer to this list to recognize authorized group members’ location or their 
join/leave information. The information in the main list enables servers to have topology control 
on different mobile group because all the information about members’ behaviour, join/leave and 
movement are necessary to support applications which need accounting. 
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Figure 8.Network structure of secure multicast in wireless networks 
In this step, we discuss about join/leave process of mobile members through different areas of 
wireless networks. As mentioned before, mobile users in each area are managed by the wireless 
server of that area. Different AWSs support different collections of multicast groups. The 
process of join/leave is as following steps. 
(1) When a mobile user joins a multicast group, it sends IGMP message to its AWS. 
(2) Then, AWS forwards this message to the nearest router to connect to the main server. 
(3) The new user sends join request to the AWS for receiving Area Group Key (AKG) of the 
group which wants to join. 
(4) Before delivering the AKG, the AWS performs user authentication procedure using one-time 
password protocol.  
(5) If user authentication is done successfully, the AKG is updated and is sent to that new user 
by AWS.  
(6) At this time, main server sends the desired group content to the AWS.  
(7) Next, AWS delivers the group service to the new member. The remaining group members 
in this area generate the new AKGthemselves using CKC protocol. 
(8) When a member leaves the group, it sends a leave request to its AWS.  
(9) Next, the AWS forwards leave request to main server for stopping its content delivery. AWS 
also registers the information of that leaving member to the main server to add it to the 
main list. Next time when this member re-joins, it is authenticated by this information.  
In this part, the movement of mobile members between areas is explained. During each member 
movement, AKG of both areas, the old and new one, are updated to provide forward and 
backward secrecy respectively. We use a hand-off mechanism for handling the member 
movement. Figure 9 illustrates mobile member movement policy, when that member moves 
from its current area to new one. The movement process is described as below. 
(1) Mobile member sends two synchronous requests to the old AWS and the new one.  
(2) The old AWS sends the leaving member’s information to main server to store this 
information in the main list. 
(3) Before accepting member in the new area, the new AWS requests this member’s 
information from the main server. 
(4) By receiving the response from the main server, the new AWS starts to authenticate the new 
joining member.  
(5) If the authentication is successful, new AKG of the new area is delivered by new AWS. Until 
receiving new AKG, the old AWS is responsible for delivering group content to the moving 
member. 
(6) Synchronously, when new AWS delivers the new AKG to that mobile member, it sends an 
area join acknowledgment to the previous AWS for stopping the content distribution. 
(7) The old AWS updates its AKG to ensure backward secrecy. 
(8) At the end, new AWS sends the group content to the new area member. 
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Finally, our work has some useful features which distinct it from the other approaches. 
Simplicity is the most important feature of our approach. We combine authentication with group 
key management to use authentication information instead of member individual key. To 
increase efficiency of this approach, we propose using a group key management protocol with 
low overhead for area re-keying. Unlike the other approaches, our approach provides forward 
and backward secrecy together while member movement is occurred. 
5. DETAILED DESIGN 
This section presents the details of our approach, CRAW (Combination of Re-keying and 
Authentication in Wireless Networks).  
5.1. Notation 
Before we proceed further, we introduce the notations which we have used for explanation of 
our approach (Table 1). 
Table 1.  Notation 
  
S user password 
i number of authentication session 
Ni random number corresponding to ith authentication 
E hash function for authentication 
E(x) x is hashed once 
E2(x) x is hashed twice 
j member index 
Eｊ(x) hash value registered for member j 
⊕  bitwise XOR operation 
Km,n node key with depth of m and width of n 
uj member j 
Kj key of user j 
AKG group key shared in the group through an area 
f one-way hash function for group key management 
  
5.2. Member Join Operation 
We now use Figure 10 and Figure 11 to explain how authentication and join operation for a 
multicast group is performed in wireless networks. For simple explanation, we consider a group 
of 7 members, {u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7}, when u8 joins the group in area “B”. The AWSB is the 
manager of area “B”. The following steps show the join process of u8in details. 
(1) For connecting to the network, u8 sends IGMP message to AWSB to be able to receive the 
multicast group content. 
 
Figure 9.Movement policy 
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(2) After that, u8sends a join request to AWSB to join the group. AWSBstarts to authenticate 
u8with the main server. The user authentication is performed by two phases of one-time 
password protocol. 
I) Registration phase: 
We assume thatu8is a registered member and its information has been stored in the 
 main list. By this assumption, when N1is a random number and S is the password of u8, 
the registered information ofu8 is 8 1( )E N S⊕ . 
II)  Authentication phase: 
 u
8
 generates another random number, N2, and performs bitwise XOR with S, and then 
finds 8 2( )E N S⊕ . Here, u8calculates the following two other hash values, α and β, 
using 8 2( )E N S⊕ and sends them to AWSB. 
8 8
2 2 1
8 8
2 1
8
B
,
E ( N S ) E ( N S )
E ( N S ) E ( N S )
u AWSα β
α
β
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
→
 
  AWSB uses β and the previously registered information of u8, 8 1( )E N S⊕ and extracts
8
2( )E N S⊕ . 
8 8
1 2( ) ( )E N S E N Sβ ⊕ ⊕ = ⊕  
  Then, AWSB operates one more hash function on 8 2( )E N S⊕ and finds 82 2( )E N S⊕ . It 
performs again bitwise XOR on α and 82 2( )E N S⊕ . 
8 8
2 2 1( ) ( )E N S E N Sα ⊕ ⊕ = ⊕  
 At the end, AWSB compares the result of the above calculation, 8 1( )E N S⊕ with the 
previously registered data of u8 in the main list to verify if they match. If two values 
are equal, authentication succeeds. 8 1( )E N S⊕ isused for individual key.  
(3) Now, AWSBaccepts u8 as one of its new area members. Re-keying process in area “B” is 
done as below.  
I) AWSBupdates the area group key from AKG to a new one, AK’G using one-way 
hashfunction. 
( )G GAK f AK′ =  
II)  AWSB sends AK’Gand the position code by unicast to u8 being encrypted by K8. 
8
8 1
8
( , )
( )
B G
unicast
KAWS AK 1578
K E N S
′→
= ⊕
 
III) The current group members,{u1, u2, u3, u4, u5, u6, u7},compute AK’Gby using  one-
 way hash function of previous group key by themselves. 
1 7
,..., : ( )G Gu u AK f AK′ =  
IV) The parent node key of the new node, K5,8, is updated toK’5,8by the users according 
 fallowing formula. And also the new node, K7,8,is generated as a parent node for u7and 
 u
8
. For this purpose, they use the node codes and the new area group key. 
 
5 8
5,8
7 8
7,8
, ..., : ( )
, : ( )
G
G
u u K f AK 157
u u K f AK 1578
′ ′= ⊕
′= ⊕
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V) Then, the main server sendsthe requested content for AWSB through the wired andAWSB 
starts to deliver the content to the group members in area “B”. 
 
Figure 10.Join process in wireless networks 
 
Figure 11.The key tree in AWSB when u8 joins the group  
5.3. Member Leave Operation 
For simplicity to explain leave operation we use a simple example of 8 members in area “A” 
when u8 leaves the group.  Figure 12 illustrates the leave procedure in area “A” and Figure 13 
illustrates the key tree in area “A” after the leave of u8. 
(1) u8 sends leave request to AWSA. 
(2) AWSA forwards the leave request to the main server for stopping its content delivery.  
(3) For the re-join purpose, AWSA sends the information of u8to the main server to be stored in 
the main list. AWSA registers 8 2( )E N S⊕ for re-authentication of u8at re-join.  
(4) To provide forward secrecy, when u8leaves the group, another re-keying process is needed. 
Again, the node of K7,8 is deleted and u7 is promoted to its position. New AKG is generated 
by AWSA; this new area group key is encrypted by top node keys of each part, and then is 
sent to remaining members of each part by multicast. 
5,6
7
1 4
5 6
7
1,4
,..., : ( )
, : ( )
: ( )
G K
A G K
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(5) Then, the remaining members in the path to the root,{u5, u6, u7}, use AK’Gto update the 
affected middle node keys as following. 
5 6 7
5,7, , : ( )Gu u u K f AK 762′ ′= ⊕
 
 
Figure 12.Leave policy 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.The key tree in AWSA when u8 leaves the group 
 
5.4. Member Movement Operation 
We assume that u8has leaves the group from the area “A” and moves to area “B”, while 
remaining in the same group. Figure 14 and Figure 15 explain the movement procedure when u8 
moves from area “A” to area “B”. 
(1) When u8reaches to the edge of area “B”, it enters to hand-off mechanism. u8sends a hand-
off leave request to AWSA and synchronously sends a hand-off join request to AWSB. 
Besides that, u8sends authentication request which contains two hash values (α, β)to AWSB 
too. 
(2) At this time, AWSA delivers the information of u8 to the main server for storing in the main 
list. This user information contains data about the member’s group name, type and amount 
of its received service and the last location of that member.   
(3) AWSBstarts to authenticate new member by sending an authentication request to the main 
server about u8.  
(4) The main server looks for registered authentication information of u8in its main list and 
sends it to AWSB for re-authenticate. We assume that the available registered authentication 
information is 8 1( )E N S⊕ . 
(5) Now, AWSB moves to authentication phase of u8and authenticates u8 as explained in 
subsection 5.2. 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, July 2012 
120 
 
 
 
(6) At the end of authentication process, re-keying is performed in area “B” as explained in 
subsection 5.2. 
(7) At this moment, AWSB sends an area join acknowledgement for AWSA to stop delivering the 
service to u8. By this signalling, AWSA does re-keying process in its area for supporting 
forward secrecy as explained in subsection 5.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 14.Hand-off mechanism 
 
 
Figure 15.Member movement in wireless networks 
6. DESIGN FEATURES AND REQUIREMENTS 
In this section, we analyse and discuss design features, requirements, and compare CRAW with 
other conventional methods logically. Starting from authentication, CRAW suggests one-time 
password for authentication. Using one-time password for authentication has two advantages. 
Firstly, a part of user authentication information is stored in the server, and each time the user is 
authenticated by a new password. If the password information is eavesdropped in a session, 
only the information of that session is lost. Secondly, user authentication information can be 
used as an individual key for the group member. In fact, the property of one-time password 
which is refreshed on each session at authentication provides this opportunity to be used as 
member individual key. Consequently, the requirement for member individual key and the 
property of one-time password for member authentication are completely fit. Because of this 
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feature of CRAW, at join or inter-area movement of member, the AWS does not need to 
generate individual key for the member. Consequently, this feature decreases the overhead of 
group key management in wireless networks when movement of the members in new areas 
dynamically happens. 
Next, CRAW is a simple method in design compared with previously proposed ones. Other 
traditional methods sacrifice security requirements of secure multicast and complicate re-keying 
process to decrease the re-keying overhead with different ways. In compare, the essence of 
CRAW is simple; member authentication, join/leave and movement. In CRAW, the movement 
of a member to an area is considered as a leave from the old area and join to a new area. This is 
because of security requirements; forward secrecy in old area and backward secrecy in new 
area. Moreover, when a member moves inter-area, individual key needs to be delivered to that 
member, as in CRAW authentication information is used for individual key as well, the server 
does not need to generate individual key and deliver it to that member. In addition, CRAW 
takes advantages of CKC for group key management because in CKC members participate to 
generate the necessary keys rather than delivered by AWS. In fact, when a member joins a group 
or moves to a new area, AWS only delivers AKG to that member. 
In addition, keeping a main list in the main server is useful to manage movement of the mobile 
members. In wireless networks, it is required for AWSs to recognize users’ location and their 
latest status. This is crucial for multicast applications which need member authorization for 
accounting. This important requirement is not seen in design of conventional approaches.In 
compare, CRAW has this ability which includes user authentication information, user location 
information, and the last, group membership. 
7. COMPARISON AND RESULTS 
In this section, we analyse the efficiency of CRAW in details. First, we compare computational 
and communication overhead of our suggested group key management, CKC, with the most 
typical group key management protocol, LKH. In our comparisons, n denotes the group size 
which is the number of members in an area after join and before leave operations. The 
performance of these protocols depends on the number of key generations, key encryptions, and 
key transmissions for members at join/leave.Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize our comparisons, 
focusing on the following measures: 
 Computational overhead 
 Key generation overhead: The number of keys that must be generated at join/leave. 
 Encryption overhead: the number of encryptions. 
 Communication overhead: the number of transmissions from the key server. 
Table 2 shows the key generation overhead at join/leave operation. In LKH group members do 
not generate any keys in each join/leave operation. Therefore, in this protocol,the server has the 
most loads for key generation which is equal to tree depth and the key generation overhead 
islog2 n. In CKC, the number of key generations at join operation is 2 and at leave is 1. It is 
because at join, the new user individual key and group key, and at leave, only new group key 
need to be generated by the server. Moreover, when this protocol is combined with 
authentication the number of key generation at join is decreased to1. This mechanism reduces 
key generation overhead in CKC. 
Table 2.The comparison of key generation overhead at join/leave operation 
Protocols Join Leave 
 
  LKH 2log n  2log 1n −  
CKC 2 1 
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Table 3 shows the key encryption overhead at join/leave operation. The number of key 
encryptions for LKH is3log2 nwhich is large. It is because the server needs to encrypt all the 
updated keys with their children keys. The key encryption overhead in CKC is 1 which is small 
at join. It is because server encrypts only the new group key for the new user. CKC reduces the 
number of key encryptions at join, and keeps it at leave at the lowest level. At this time, server 
encrypts new group key by top node of each part for users of that part. So, the key encryption 
overhead in CKC at leave islog2 n.The purpose of design of CKC is to reduce computational 
overhead at join for wireless networks because in such networks simultaneous join/movement 
of members to a new area which causes large re-keying overhead in new area is more probable. 
So it is required to reduce the overhead of join operation. 
Table 3.The comparison of key encryption overhead in join/leave operation  
Protocols Join Leave 
 
  LKH 23log n  22 log n  
CKC 1 2log n  
   
Table 4 illustrates the communication overhead at join/leave for LKH, and CKC. 
Communication overhead at join is divided into two categories, unicast overhead for the new 
member and multicast overhead for the current members. As shown in Table 4, unicast 
overhead for CKC is equal to 1 because only the group key is delivered to the new user. But the 
unicast overhead is equal to the height of the key tree for LKH. The multicast overhead at join 
for LKH is equal to height of the key tree while CKC has no multicast overhead because no key 
is delivered to the current members at join. On the other hand, when a member leaves the group, 
the communication overhead for  CKC is equal to the height of the key tree while LKH has two 
times of transmission message numbers in compare with CKC transmissions.  
Table 4.The comparison of communication overhead at join/leave operation 
Protocols  Join   Leave  
unicast multicast multicast 
 
   LKH 2log n  2log n  22 log n  
CKC 1 - 2log n  
   
 
Table 5 illustrates summary of re-keying cost and the required time for joining a new member. 
As the previous methods for group key management are based on LKH, the re-keying cost of 
them at join is log2 n+1. CKC reducesthis cost largely to 2. But in CRAW, by using one-time 
password protocol for member authentication, the re-keying cost of CKC has been decreased to 
1, because the individual key is equal to user’s authentication information in CRAW. At leave 
operation, our method has the same re-keying cost, log2 nwhich is similar to the previously 
proposed ones. Another important result is about the required time when a new member joins 
the group,β, which is smaller than join required time in previous method,α. In fact, using one-
time password protocol for member authentication decreases the authentication time. 
Table 5. Summarized of re-keying cost and member authentication time 
Methods  Re-keying Cost  Required Join Setup Time join leave 
 
  
 
Previous  2log 1n +  2log n  a 
CRAW 1 2log n  β (β < α) 
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When a new member sends a join request to the server, member authentication and preparing a 
unique individual key for that member are performed respectively.  We call this process join 
setup time. At the end of join-setup process, the member’s individual key is delivered through a 
secure channel.We compare join-setup time of CRAW with other models for wireless 
networks.Tordinary-join-setupandTCRAW-join-setupare defined as the time required for join-setup process in 
the other modelsand CRAW respectively. According to the following formula, the ordinary 
join-setup time contains two time intervals which belong to the preparation of individual key for 
new member and also the authentication process. However, the CRAW join-setup time just 
includes the member authentication period. 
ordinary join setup authentication individual key preparation
CRAW join setup authentication
T T T
T T
− −
− −
= +
=
 
Note that in the individual key preparation include two different operations, key generation and 
key distribution. Here, we do not consider the key encryption mechanism because the individual 
key is sent for the new member through the secure channel. The following formula shows the 
time needed for individual key preparation. 
individual key preparation key generation key distributionT T T= +  
In CRAW, we use one-time password protocol for member authentication. By using one-time 
password method, we do not have any time consuming for individual key generation and 
distribution for a new member. The other approaches do not consider a specific authentication 
algorithm and they have just assumed that member authentication is occurred by a regular 
authentication protocol. Although the authentication time with one-time password is a little bit 
longer than general authentication methods, the overhead time gets shorter than the individual 
key preparation time in other approaches. Consequently, CRAW join-setup time is smaller than 
the other’s. Because the difference of join-setup time of CRAW and the ordinary ones, δ, is less 
than the total needed time for an individual key generation and distribution.   
ordinary join setup CRAW join setup
ordinary join setup CRAW join setup
key generation key distribution
T T
T T
T T
δ
δ
− − − −
− − − −
>
− =

= +
 
To show the correctness of the above equations, we have performed an experiment to collect the 
average time of member authentication with one-time password protocol and the traditional 
authentication algorithm. The simulation source code is in PHP language. The simulation has 
been run on two parts, the client side and the server side. The hardware information of the 
machine is 2.83 GHz, Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Quad with CPU 708.351 MHz processor speed. The 
total memory is and 524288 in the server side. On the other hand, the information of the 
machine in the client side is a 2.67 GHz Windows Vista processor with 4 GB of RAM.In this 
experiment, we have collected the authentication time of 100 users. Table 6 summarizes our 
results for member authentication time. 
Table 6.The comparison of member authentication time with different protocols 
Authentication Protocol Minimum (sec) Maximum (sec) Average (sec) 
    
One-time Password 0.000669 0.005117 0.002517 
General 0.000123 0.00086 0.000237 
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To find the individual key generation and distribution time, we have used a program to measure    
ind ividua l key preparationT of the conventional methods. This program computes the processing time 
of generating and delivering a random individual key. Our source code is based on the script 
language program, ruby, with OpenSSL cryptography library. We run this program on a 2.00 
GHz Windows Vista processor with 2 GB of RAM. The results show that the required time 
forgenerating and distributing an individual key for a new member is 0.939000 (sec).According 
to the achieved results from Table 6 and using the above equation, the join-setup time for 
CRAW and the conventional methods is as below. 
(sec).
(sec).
(sec)
0.000237 0.939000
0.939237
0.002517
0.93672
ordinary join setup
CRAW join setup
ordinary join setup CRAW join setup
T
T
T T
− −
− −
− − − −
= +
=
=
− =
 
As mentioned in section 5.4, another feature of CRAW is hand-off mechanism for a mobile 
member who moves inter-area intra group. We implement our policies for member movement 
through a simple network with a simulator program, OMNeT++, version 4.1b4.  Figure 16 
illustrates our graphical result on network delay which is caused by our hand-off mechanism 
during the simulation time. In our experiment, a mobile member leaves the current area, and 
then joins a new area. 
In fact, three operations occur in the joining area respectively; probe, re-authentication and re-
association process. First, when a mobile member receives to the edge of its area, it starts to 
search for a new AWS to connect it. In this duration, the mobile member sends some probe 
requests to different AWSs until valid AWS responses. Second, when the moving member sends 
its join request to the valid AWS, re-authentication phase is started. The new AWS tries to re-
authenticate the mobile member with the help of the main server. After accepting the mobile 
node’s join request by the new AWS, re-association procedure is started. In this period, AWS 
performs group key management in its area, and then sends necessary keys for the new member 
and current area members. Obviously, each of these three processes causes some delay period 
in content delivery to the mobile member. According to the following formula, the sum of these 
delays is the total delay which hand-off mechanism implies to the network. 
CRAW hand off probe re authentication re associationT T T T− − − −= + +
 
 
Figure 16.Hand-off delay for a mobile member 
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Figure 16 shows wireless delay time (sec) versus our simulation time (sec) for the moving 
mobile member. Three delay intervals are occurred in delay graph of this mobile member. The 
first delay, 0.0195167 (sec), is the time which is spent for finding a valid AWS. The second 
delay is 0.002517 (sec) which is the re-authentication time that the new AWS causes this delay. 
At last, after probe and re-authentication delay, new AWS does re-keying and sends the new area 
group key for the new user. This task causes 0.924 (sec)delay. After joining the mobile user to 
the new area, we do not have any delay until the end of the simulation because it remains in this 
area, and just receives the group content. At the end of the simulation, we calculate CRAW 
hand-off time which is equal to sum of all delays of the mobile node, 0.9460337 (sec). Our 
numerical values of hand-off time parameters are illustrated in Table 7.  
Table 7.Hand-off delay time parameters 
Delay Parameters Time (sec) 
  
Probe 0.01951670 
Re-authentication 0.00251700 
Re-association 0.92400000 
  
According to Table 7, hand-off re-authentication time of CRAW is equal to 0.002517 which is 
the same as authentication time with one-time password protocol (Table 6). On the other hand, 
CRAW uses CKC for re-association in each wireless area, therefore the lowest computational 
and communication overhead is occurred. By using CKC in re-association, just the new area 
group key is sent to the new area member. This re-keying mechanism takes a small period of 
time in compare with the other protocols. As stated before, the other area re-keying methods use 
the LKH based protocol for re-association. Therefore, they send new area group key to the new 
area member along with sending it to the current area members. In other words, the 
conventional models have much more re-keying overheads; therefore they cannot have an 
efficient re-association time. 
Consequently, the other area re-keying methods do not propose directly a group key 
management protocol. They try to suggest other mechanisms, not an efficient re-keying 
algorithm, for reducing the re-keying cost through mobile member movement process. 
Obviously, it is not a correct comparison if we want to compare CRAW hand-off mechanism 
with them, because they do not describe their hand-off method. On the other hand, none of the 
previously proposedmethods measure their hand-off time exactly. In the previously proposed 
methods, they claim that using their methods can reduce re-keying overhead when a movement 
is occurred. Actually, in most cases, they suggest to reduce number of key update operation in 
network areas. Finally, the other methods just have focused on the number of re-keying 
procedures while we focus on using an efficient group key management protocol, and in 
addition having a secure and efficient authentication protocol in CRAW method. We examined 
the efficiency of CRAW based on its details and duration time of each step along with the 
logical proof. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude our approach with its some contributions and features. In this paper, we have 
combined the group key management with the user authentication in wireless networks for the 
first time. In CRAW, re-keying process is done by CKC, and the multicast member 
authentication is performed by one-time password protocol. Unlike the other methods, CRAW 
provides a simple and secure mechanism for supporting both forward and backward secrecy 
with the lowest re-keying overhead.  At the end, we summarize our result with some of its 
contributions and features: 
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 CRAW achieves high performance by separating wired and wireless networks for group key 
management.  
 CRAW reduces re-keying overhead largely in each join/leave and movement. 
 CRAW supports secure inter-area movement for mobile member. 
 CRAW uses authentication information for group key management in a simple and secure 
method. 
 CRAW benefits from the speed of hash function for authentication mechanism. 
 CRAW is able to control the user location through the networks by saving a central list. 
 CRAW supports accounting applications using member topology control. 
 In CRAW, the group content distribution is performed continuously without any 
interruption.  
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